In CEH v13 Cryptography, this threat is formally referred to as “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” (HNDL). It describes a long-term cryptographic risk where adversaries intercept and store encrypted communications today, even though they cannot decrypt them with current computational capabilities. The expectation is that future quantum computers will be powerful enough to break widely used public-key cryptographic algorithms.
CEH v13 emphasizes that quantum algorithms such as Shor’s Algorithm can theoretically break RSA, DSA, and ECC by efficiently solving integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems. However, the defining feature of this threat is not the act of breaking encryption itself, but rather the strategic collection and storage of encrypted data in advance.
Option C is incomplete because it focuses only on the cryptographic mechanism rather than the threat model. Options B and D are unrelated to the scenario described and refer to quantum communication integrity issues, not long-term cryptographic exposure.
CEH v13 highlights that sensitive data with long confidentiality lifetimes—such as government records, financial data, healthcare information, and intellectual property—is especially vulnerable to this threat. As a result, organizations are encouraged to adopt quantum-resistant (post-quantum) cryptographic algorithms proactively.
Thus, Option A accurately describes the threat model and aligns with CEH v13’s treatment of future cryptographic risks.
