The scenario describes a Layer 7 (application-layer) denial-of-service pattern: Javier sends a wave of repetitive web requests that specifically overload backend scripts responsible for search queries and form submissions. This is characteristic of an HTTP GET/POST attack, where the attacker floods a web application with large volumes of HTTP requests—commonly GET requests for pages/resources and POST requests that trigger server-side processing (login, checkout, searches, form handlers). Because these requests can be syntactically valid and target costly operations, they can quickly exhaust CPU, memory, threads, database connections, or application worker pools, resulting in slow responses and timeouts for legitimate users—exactly what the customers experience here.
Why the other options don’t fit as well:
Slowloris (A) is also an application-layer technique, but it works differently: it holds many connections open by sending partial HTTP headers very slowly, aiming to exhaust the server’s concurrent connection capacity. The question emphasizes repetitive requests overloading backend scripts, not slow, incomplete requests holding sockets open.
UDP Flood (B) is a network/transport-layer volumetric attack that sends massive UDP packets to random or targeted ports, consuming bandwidth and host resources. It doesn’t specifically target web scripts handling search/forms.
Peer-to-Peer Attack (C) typically involves abusing P2P networks or reflection/amplification through distributed peers; it’s not described as direct repetitive web requests to application endpoints.
The key indicators are: (1) web requests (2) targeting script-driven functions like search and form submissions, and (3) resulting in user-facing slowness/timeouts due to overwhelmed application processing. These align most directly with D. HTTP GET/POST Attack.
