When designing a microservice architecture where each microservice interacts with different AWS services, it's essential to follow the principle of least privilege. This means granting each microservice only the permissions it needs to perform its tasks, reducing the risk of unauthorized access or accidental actions.
The recommended approach is to create individualIAM roleswith policies that grant each microservice the specific permissions it requires. Then, these roles should be associated with the EC2 instances that run the corresponding microservice. By doing so, each EC2 instance will assume its specific IAM role, and permissions will be automatically managed by AWS.
IAM roles provide temporary credentials via the instance metadata service, eliminating the need to hard-code credentials in your application code, which enhances security.
AWS References:
IAM Roles for Amazon EC2explains how EC2 instances can use IAM roles to securely access AWS services without managing long-term credentials.
Best Practices for IAMincludes recommendations for implementing the least privilege principle and using IAM roles effectively.
Why the other options are incorrect:
A. Assign an IAM user to each microservice: This requires managing long-term credentials (access keys), which should be avoided. Storing keys in application code is insecure and creates a maintenance burden.
B. Create a single IAM role: This violates the principle of least privilege, as a single role with broad permissions across all services is less secure.
C. Use AWS Organizations: This approach adds unnecessary complexity. Managing permissions at the account level for each microservice is excessive for this use case and doesn't adhere to the principle of least privilege.
