A registered representative (RR) reads an article online about a thinly traded security that the...

This fact pattern describes a classic conflict-and-manipulation style scenario: the RR buys first, promotes purchases to customers in a thinly traded security, benefits from the price increase that customer buying helps create, then sells for a profit and tells customers to sell afterward. In FINRA terms, this is consistent with a deceptive practice that violates standards of commercial honor and fair dealing (e.g., conduct rules requiring ethical behavior and prohibiting manipulative or deceptive devices). Thinly traded securities are especially vulnerable because relatively small buying pressure can move the price materially; when an RR uses their position and influence over customers to create demand that benefits the RR’s own account, regulators view that as improper and potentially manipulative.

Choice B is wrong because “customers also made money” does not cure a deceptive or manipulative practice. The issue is the RR’s conduct, conflicts, and potential misuse of customer recommendations to profit personally. Choice C is wrong because suitability and ethical standards apply regardless of a customer’s wealth level; high net worth does not make conflicted or deceptive conduct permissible. Choice D is wrong because there is no rule that representatives may only accept unsolicited orders for thinly traded securities. Firms may accept solicited orders if recommendations are suitable and communications are fair and balanced, but the scenario here is about deceptive/conflicted trading behavior.

On the SIE, this falls under prohibited practices and market manipulation concepts, including ethics, conflicts of interest, and improper trading ahead of customers.