A developer has an application that pushes files from an on-premises local server to an...

The most secure approach on Amazon EC2 is to avoid long-term static credentials entirely and rely on IAM roles for Amazon EC2 (instance profiles). When an EC2 instance is associated with an instance profile, AWS automatically provides temporary security credentials to the instance through the instance metadata service (IMDS) . The AWS SDK and CLI can retrieve and rotate these credentials automatically, eliminating the need to store an access key and secret key on disk. This reduces the risk of credential leakage and removes the operational burden of key rotation.

In this scenario, the EC2 instance is already configured with an IAM instance profile in the same account as the S3 bucket. Because the bucket is in the same account and the instance profile can be granted the required permissions, there is no security benefit to keeping a separate stored access key/secret key or performing an additional STS AssumeRole hop. The simplest and most secure design is to attach an IAM policy to the instance profile role that allows the required s3:PutObject (and any related actions such as s3:PutObjectAcl if needed) on the specific bucket/prefix. The application code can then call S3 directly using the AWS SDK, which will automatically use the instance profile credentials.

Option A continues to use long-lived static credentials stored on the server, which is less secure than instance profiles. Option D is the same problem with different keys: still long-lived credentials that must be protected and rotated. Option B removes stored keys but keeps an AssumeRole call; although AssumeRole uses temporary credentials, it adds complexity and is unnecessary here because the instance already has an IAM role and the S3 bucket is in the same account.

Therefore, the most secure solution is C : remove static keys and the AssumeRole code and use the instance profile role with least-privilege S3 permissions.